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This paper studies how comparing can be used to provide information in financial 
markets in the presence of a hidden characteristics problem. Although an investor 
cannot precisely estimate the future returns of an entrepreneur’s projects, the 
investor can mitigate the asymmetric information problem by ranking different 
entrepreneurs and financing only the very best ones. Information asymmetry can 
be eliminated with certainty if the number of compared projects is sufficiently 
large. Because comparing favours centralised information gathering, it creates a 
novel rationale for the establishment of a financial intermediary. 
 
Key words: asymmetric information, banking, corporate finance, financial 
intermediation, ranking, venture capital 
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Rahoitusmarkkinoiden rahoituksenhakijoiden vertailu 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 1/2006 
Juha-Pekka Niinimäki – Tuomas Takalo – Klaus Kultti 




Tutkimuksessa esitetään uusi argumentti sille, miksi rahoituksenvälitys ja pankki-
toiminta ovat syntyneet ja miksi nämä toimialat ovat usein keskittyneitä. Argu-
mentti perustuu mahdollisuuteen vertailla yrittäjiä ja muita rahoituksen tar-
vitsijoita. Yksi keskeinen tunnettu peruste rahoituksenvälityksen syntymiselle on 
epäsymmetrinen informaatio yrittäjien ja rahoittajien välillä. Ajatellaan, että ra-
hoituksenvälittäjät voivat yksittäisiä rahoittajia paremmin arvioida yrittäjien 
laatua investoimalla riskienhallintatekniikkaan. Aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissa ei 
ole kuitenkaan otettu huomioon mahdollisuutta vertailla erilaisia yrittäjiä. Vertai-
lemalla rahoituksenhakijoita rahoituksenvälittäjä voi laittaa hakijat paremmuus-
järjestykseen ja rahoittaa vain parhaita. Tämä vähentää ja saattaa jopa kokonaan 
poistaa epäsymmetrisestä informaatiosta aiheutuvia ongelmia ja siten esimerkiksi 
vähentää merkittävästi pankkien luottotappioita. 
 
Avainsanat: epäsymmetrinen informaatio, rahoituksenvälitys, pankkitoiminta, 
yritysrahoitus, pääomasijoittaminen. 
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Asymmetric information has long been recognised as a key problem in financial 
markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; de Meza and Webb, 1987). There are several 
means by which outside investors can mitigate the adverse effects of asymmetric 
information: ex ante monitoring (Broecker, 1990), interim and ex post monitoring 
(Holmström and Tirole, 1997; Diamond, 1984), collateral requirements (Bester, 
1985) and long-term lending relationships (von Thadden, 1995).
1 It is widely felt 
that the need for such things in the credit markets can explain the existence of 
financial intermediaries. The analysis is extended in this paper, which explores 
how comparing funding applicants can help to mitigate – even eliminate – the 
asymmetric information problem in financial markets, and how this benefit of 
comparing is conducive to centralised financial intermediation. 
  What does ex ante monitoring mean in the context of financial markets? 
Theory suggests that outside investors ought to gather comprehensive information 
on each entrepreneur or firm applying for funding and on their projects. For 
example, the skills and experience of the entrepreneur or firm’s management, the 
quality of the business plan, the tangible and intangible assets, the market 
potential of the products, and the cost efficiency should all be examined in detail. 
Based on this information, investors can evaluate the expected returns of the 
funding applicant’s projects. If the returns seem to be high enough, investors can 
provide finance at appropriate (risk-based) pricing. It is, however, not easy to 
assess expected returns precisely or to price risks correctly. In particular, in new 
markets where investors have little, or no, prior experience and entrepreneurs’ 
assets are intangible, it is virtually impossible to make precise evaluations. In 
more familiar sectors, finance for new entrepreneurs with no track record is 
difficult to price. Even if entrepreneurs or firms seeking outside finance are well 
known to the investors, rapid changes in the economic environment may hamper 
the rating of applicants and hence their funding. 
  In this paper we argue that investors can overcome the difficulties in ex ante 
monitoring by ranking the entrepreneurs. Although investors are unable to 
accurately estimate expected returns from an entrepreneur’s projects, they can 
compare the entrepreneurs, choose the very best, and finance their projects. These 
projects will succeed with above-average probability. Hence comparing enables 
investors to gather valuable information and thereby to boost their investment 
yields. Moreover, if an investor compares sufficiently many entrepreneurs, the 
asymmetric information problem will be eliminated with certainty. 
  As an example, consider 10 de novo entrepreneurs from the same narrow 
high-tech sector. Such entrepreneurs typically have fresh prototype products, their 
                                                 
1 Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Gorton and Winton (2003) provide thorough surveys of this 
literature.  
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primary assets consist of human capital and intellectual property rights, and they 
lack funds for the investments required to commercialise the prototypes. Any 
outside investor will certainly find it a demanding task to assess the value of a 
prototype, its expected sales revenues, marketing strategy and ability of 
entrepreneurs, and so on. However, if the investor would contact each of the 10 
firms and investigate their prototypes, intellectual property portfolios, and 
entrepreneurial talent and then compare these, she may discover crucial 
differences between entrepreneurs’ business plans. The investor can rank the 
entrepreneurs and finance only the best ones. As a result, the investor can be quite 
confident that the best entrepreneurs’ products and plans are of sufficiently high 
quality that the entrepreneurs will be able to repay the funding. 
  To benefit from comparing, however, an outside investor needs to evaluate 
numerous entrepreneurs, even if she can finance only one. With multiple investors 
operating in isolation, each entrepreneur is evaluated and compared several times. 
This duplicates the costs of information gathering. Wasteful duplication could be 
avoided if the investors joined together to establish a financial intermediary, 
which would evaluate each funding applicant, compare and rank them, and 
finance only the best ones. Each applicant is evaluated only once, and inefficient 
duplication is eliminated. Consequently, comparing creates a novel rationale for 
centralised financial intermediation and delegated information gathering. In this 
respect our paper is related to the literature on the role of asymmetric information 
in explaining financial intermediaries. Beyond the seminal contribution by Leland 
and Pyle (1977), our argument is closely related those of Diamond (1984), 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Boyd and Prescott (1986). As in these 
papers, a major advantage of forming a financial intermediary in our model is to 
reduce monitoring costs. Another advantage is information production in the sprit 
of Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986). Finally, our 
intermediary engages in asset transformation as in Diamond (1984) and Boyd and 
Prescott (1986). Our work thus adds to the long string of literature that extends the 
basic insights on financial intermediaries as delegated monitors and information 
gatherers into various dimensions (see, eg Krasa and Villamil, 1992, Winton, 
1995, Cerasi and Daltung, 2000, Hellwig, 2000, and Niinimäki, 2001). 
  Although the intermediary emerging from our analysis is bank-like and we 
treat entrepreneurs seeking outside finance as loan applicants, most of the analysis 
deals with a single investor and need not specify the form of the financial 
contract. Moreover, the benefits of comparing are most evident in the finance of 
new ideas in new markets, where debt contracts are less predominant. Our paper 
therefore touches the literature on entities that finance innovation such as private 
equity and venture capitalists (for an authoritative survey of venture capital 
finance, see Gompers and Lerner, 2004). In particular, our study sheds light on the 
question of why and how venture capitalists benchmark their projects as in 
Bergemann and Hege (2002). In contrast to Bergemann and Hege (2002), which  
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emphasises the value of benchmarking and staggered project finance in alleviating 
moral hazard, project comparison in our model provides benchmarks that mitigate 
the hidden information problem. 
  Another connection with the works of Bergeman and Hege (1998, 2002) is 
that comparing can be seen as a special form of costly learning or experimentation 
in financial markets. Although comparing mitigates the asymmetric information 
problem, it is costly, since an investor must monitor numerous funding applicants 
to gather information. Thus the investor has to weigh the opportunity cost of 
comparing against the future informational benefits, as in the theory of 
experimentation. The key difference versus the learning and experimentation 
literature is that information derived by comparing exploits the differences 
between funding applicants and does not require observations on the same 
applicant over time. Indeed, in our model no additional information is gained by 
observing the same applicant more than once. 
  The paper is organised as follows. In sections 2–3 we develop the main ideas 
and present the costs and benefits of comparing using a simple model with one 
investor and at most two entrepreneurs. In section 4 we consider a more general 
environment where the number of potential entrepreneurs can increases without 
bound. In section 5 we allow for multiple investors and show how comparing can 
explain the existence of financial intermediaries. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 The  economy 
2.1 Financial  market  participants 
In the basic model there are, N  ∈ Z
+, risk-neutral entrepreneurs and one risk-
neutral investor. In section 5 we allow for multiple investors. The entrepreneurs 
lack funds, but each has a project that requires a fixed start-up investment of unit 
size. The funding can be obtained from the investor (she), who has a unit of 
capital but no project of her own. The project of an entrepreneur (he) is good with 
probability g and bad with probability  g 1− . Project quality is the private 
information of entrepreneurs and, without risk of confusion, we refer to good and 
bad entrepreneurs. A good project yields a transferable income Y with certainty, 
and a bad project only generates a non-transferable private benefit B to the 
entrepreneur. 
 We  assume  that  contacting an entrepreneur is costly. This cost, denoted by c, 
includes, eg, the costs of waiting or searching for an entrepreneur, evaluating and 
monitoring his project, making the funding decision, and writing the funding 
contract or informing of the rejection of funding application. The cost occurs 
when the investor contacts and monitors an entrepreneur, and it cannot be  
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avoided. A contact provides an informative signal about the entrepreneur’s type, 
which will be specified in the next subsection.
2 
  Since there is only one investor we assume, without loss of generality, that the 
investor has full bargaining power. Besides simplifying the analysis, the 
assumption is convenient when we look more closely at the benefits of centralised 
financial intermediation with multiple investors in section 5, since the assumption 
implies that investors have no incentive to form a financial intermediary to gain 
market power. The assumption also means that the form of financial contract is 
indeterminate: the investor can seize the output of a good project by driving the 
entrepreneur to the zero profit level. In anticipation of the discussion of financial 
intermediation in section 5, we refer to entrepreneurs as loan applicants, in which 
case the loan interest rate is Y. It is assumed that  0 c r Y > − −  where  1 r ≥  
denotes the economy’s risk-free interest rate (investor’s opportunity cost). Hence 
a good project has a positive net present value. In contrast, a bad entrepreneur is 





Upon contacting an entrepreneur, the investor receives an informative signal on 
the entrepreneur’s type. The signal can originate from any information reflecting 
profitability of the entrepreneur’s project and can take any of three values: s1, s2, 
and s3. Besides entrepreneur’s type, the value of a signal depends on the state of 
the world: 
 
•  With probability h, the state of the world is high, in which case a good 
entrepreneur’s signal is invariably s1 and a bad entrepreneur’s signal is 
invariably s2. 
 
• With  probability  h 1− , the state of the world is low, in which case a good 
entrepreneur’s signal is invariably s2 and a bad entrepreneur’s signal s3. 
 
It is instructive (but not necessary) to assume that  3 2 1 s s s > > . Then an average 
signal is high in a high state of the world and low in a low state of the world. For 
simplicity, we do not allow the state of the word to affect the project return but 
                                                 
2 Although we believe that unavoidable contacting and monitoring costs are empirically relevant, 
the assumption is essentially a short-cut. We could have regarded c as a signal extraction expense 
and assumed that it can be avoided but only at the cost of not receiving the signal. This would have 
complicated the analysis by adding one layer to the decision problem of the investor but would not 
qualitatively have changed the main results. 
3 Strictly speaking we do not need the assumption that B < r, but it is more appropriate to label 
entrepreneurs bad if their projects have negative net present value.  
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only the value of the signal. Because a good entrepreneur cannot emit the signal s3 
and a bad entrepreneur cannot emit s1, the signals s1 and s3 are perfectly 
informative in that they fully reveal both the state of the world and type of loan 
applicant. Signal s1 tells the investor that the state of the world is high and the 
entrepreneur is good. Similarly, signal s3 says that the state of the world is low 
and the entrepreneur is bad. In sum, after observing either s1 or s3, the investor 
operates under perfect information. 
 Signal  s2 is more interesting. It indicates a bad entrepreneur in a high state of 
the world or a good one in a low state. Although the investor can use the signal s2 
to update her prior beliefs about the state of the world and entrepreneur’s type, 
asymmetric information remains after observing such a signal. If the first loan 
applicant emits s2, the investor must accept or reject the application without 
knowing the entrepreneur’s type or she can gather more information by contacting 
another entrepreneur and comparing him with the first one. If the second 
entrepreneur emits s1, the state of the world is necessarily high and the investor 
knows that the first entrepreneur is bad and the second entrepreneur is good. If the 
second entrepreneur emits s3, the investor knows that the state of the world is low, 
the first entrepreneur is good and the second is bad. In such cases we assume that 
the investor can return to the first entrepreneur and grant him a loan. Thus if the 
signal of the second loan applicant is s1 or s3, the asymmetric information is 
eliminated and the investor can make her lending decision under perfect 
information. 
  If the second applicant also emits s2, we still have asymmetric information. 
However, even in this case, seeking a second loan applicant and comparing with 
the first yields useful information, since the investor can update her beliefs about 
the state of the world and entrepreneur’s type. Thus, although the investor still 
must make a lending decision under asymmetric information, she is better 
informed. Based on the new information, the investor can decide whether to grant 
a loan to either of the two contacted entrepreneurs, search for a third one, or not to 
lend. Since contacting a new loan applicant is costly, the investor encounters an 
optimal stopping problem each time she receives the signal s2. 
  In sum, the signalling technology builds on two key properties. First, each 
signal is informative. Second, it is more informative to compare several 
entrepreneurs than just to observe the same entrepreneur over time. The second 
property follows from our assumption that signals can vary according to the state 
of the world. We could avoid signal variation by assuming that a single signal is 
uninformative except if compared to other signals. Although such an assumption 
would simplify the analysis, it would be highly unrealistic. On the contrary, it is 
easy to cite examples where signals depend on the state of the world: 
 
•  Business cycles distort the values of the signals. For instance, a good firm 
might earn good profits if the industry is booming or moderate profits if the  
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industry is in recession, whereas a bad firm might earn moderate profits 
during a boom or fail in a recession. Hence, whether moderate profit indicates 
a good or a bad firm would depend on the stage of the industry cycle. 
 
•  The profitability of a firm varies with the industry equilibria. Efficient firms 
may, for example, earn supernormal profits if the firms collude and moderate 
profits if they compete. Less efficient firms may earn moderate profits if they 
collude or zero profits if the they compete. Moderate profits may signal an 
efficient firm if the firms compete or an inefficient firm if the firms collude.  
 
•  Technological cycles change the meanings of signals. The propensity to 
patent changes over time depending on the legal and technological 
environment. For example, it is known that innovations can come in waves: 
after a breakthrough invention it is easier to make follow up innovations. A 
successful innovative firm may possess dozens of patents after a 
breakthrough, having had only a handful before. A less innovative firm, 
having struggled to obtain one patent before the breakthrough, may easily 
obtain a handful of patents after the breakthrough. For an outsider, it is hard to 
know whether a handful of patents indicates an innovative or an unsuccessful 
firm. 
 
•  There are differences between business sectors. Financial ratios, for example, 
reveal information to investors. Some of this information is industry-specific. 
What is regarded as a good ratio of asset turnover, administration costs, gross 
profit or solvency will vary across industries. Consider three solvency ratios, 
3 2 1 x x x > > , and two sectors, A and B. In sector A, a firm is good if its 
solvency is x1 and bad if the solvency is x2. In sector B, a firm may be good if 
its solvency is x2 and bad if its solvency is x3. Hence, whether x2 indicates a 
good or a bad firm, is a sector-specific matter. 
 
•  The values of signals vary by region. Wages and costs of business premises, 
for example, can vary from region to region. The same wage cost per 
employee may indicate a good, efficient firm in Area A, or a bad, inefficient 




2.3  The timing of events 
First, the investor decides whether to incur cost c to contact an entrepreneur. 
Second, the investor receives a signal on the entrepreneur’s type and updates her 
belief about type and state of the world. In the third stage, the investor faces three 
options. She can grant a loan to any of the entrepreneurs she has contacted or 
whether to invest c to acquire more information by comparing a new loan 
applicant with the previous ones, or she can refuse to lend. 
 
 
3  Comparing with two loan applicants 
In this section, we first consider a benchmark loan market with perfect 
information. We then further develop concepts in the context of a simple example 
where there is only one loan applicant in the economy, so that comparing is 
impossible. Finally, we introduce a second loan applicant and demonstrate the 
value of comparing. 
 
 
3.1 Perfect  information 
Under perfect information the investor can separate good from bad firms and 
grant a loan to a good one. The following assumption ensures the establishment of 
a loan market. 
 
Assumption. Under perfect information, lending is profitable to the investor, ie 
 
0 c ) r Y ( g > − −  (3.1) 
 
As explained, g in (3.1) is the probability of contacting a good entrepreneur. In 
such case the investor grants a loan at interest rate Y; r denotes the opportunity 
cost of invested capital and c the cost of a contact. In what follows, information is 
assumed to be asymmetric, but the Assumption is satisfied. 
 
 
3.2 Asymmetric  information with one loan applicant 
If the economy consists of one just entrepreneur, comparing is impossible and the 
investor’s problem is simple. She has to decide first whether to incur c and contact 
the entrepreneur and then whether to grant a loan to the entrepreneur given her  
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updated belief about the entrepreneur’s type. With probability hg, the signal is s1. 
With this signal, the investor knows that the entrepreneur is good and she grants 
him a loan. With probability  ) g 1 )( h 1 ( − −  the signal is s3 and the investor knows 
that the entrepreneur is bad and she does not grant a loan. With probability 
g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h − + −  the signal is s2 and the investor can update her belief about 
entrepreneur’s type, but information asymmetry remains. In such a case, the 
investor may or may not grant a ‘risky loan’, ie, a loan in the presence of 
uncertainty about the type of entrepreneur. Thus the value of a loan to the investor 
with one entrepreneur in the economy is given by 
 
() [] {} 0   , c ) s ( v g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h r Y hg max V 2 R 1 N − − + − + − = =  (3.2) 
 
where subscript N=1 of V is the number of entrepreneurs in the economy and 
 
() {} 0   , r Y ) s g ( p max s v 2 2 R − =  (3.3) 
 
is the value of a risky loan, given the signal s2. In (3.3) 
 
g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h
g ) h 1 (
) s g ( p 2 − + −
−
=  (3.4) 
 
is the conditional probability that an entrepreneur emitting s2 is good. From (3.1) 




3.3  Asymmetric information with two loan applicants 
With two entrepreneurs, the investor can gather information by comparing. To 
begin with, she must decide whether to contact either of the entrepreneurs. If she 
contacts one of them, she has to decide whether to grant a loan to him or contact a 
second one and compare the two. If she also contacts a second entrepreneur, she 
must decide whether to grant a loan to either or neither of the two entrepreneurs. 
If the first signal is either s1 or s3, the investor’s decision problem is 
straightforward so we first characterise them. 
  The first signal is s1. If the signal from the first entrepreneur is s1, the investor 
knows that he is good. There is no need to contact and compare with a second 
entrepreneur, and the investor grants a loan to the first entrepreneur, which yields 
r Y −  with certainty. 
  The first signal is s3. If the first entrepreneur emits s3, the entrepreneur is bad 
with certainty. If the second contact also yields s3, the investor does not lend. If  
15 
the second entrepreneur emits s2, the investor can eliminate the asymmetric 
information problem by comparing signals. Because the first signal, s3, reveals 
that the state of the world is low, the second entrepreneur, emitting s2, must be 
good. Hence the second entrepreneur, emitting s2, is a worthy borrower. Since the 
probability that the second entrepreneur emits s2 is g, the value of a loan when s3 
is the first signal is given by  { } 0   , c ) r Y ( g max ) s ( v 3 − − = . As  0 c ) r Y ( g > − −  by 
the Assumption, we obtain 
 
0 c ) r Y ( g ) s ( v 3 > − − =  (3.5) 
 
Note that the value of a loan stems entirely from the possibility of comparing the 
entrepreneurs. 
  The first signal is s2. In this case the investor’s problem is more complicated. 
If the second entrepreneur also emits s2, the investor cannot be sure about the 
entrepreneurs’ type and can only update her beliefs. The value of a risky loan 
when both signals are s2 is given by 
 
{ } 0   , r Y ) s , s g ( p max ) s , s ( v 2 2 2 2 R − =  (3.6) 
 




2 2 g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h
g ) h 1 (
) s , s g ( p
− + −
−
=  (3.7) 
 
is the conditional probability that signal s2 indicates a good entrepreneur after two 
observations. 
  If the second entrepreneur emits s1, the investor knows that she is dealing with 
a good entrepreneur and grants a loan. If the second entrepreneur emits s3, the 
investor knows that the state is low, the entrepreneur is bad and the first 
entrepreneur is good. The investor thus grants a loan to the first entrepreneur. 
When the first signal is s2, the value of a loan can be written as 
 
() {} c ) s , s ( v ) t 1 ( r Y t    ), s ( v max ) s ( v 2 2 R 2 2 2 R 2 − − + − =  (3.8) 
 
where  [] ) g 1 ( ) s h ( p 1 g ) s h ( p t 2 2 2 − − + =  is the probability that information 
asymmetry can be eliminated by using the second signal. Here 
 
) s g ( p 1
g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h
) g 1 ( h
) s h ( p 2 2 − =
− + −
−
=  (3.9) 
  
16 
is the conditional probability that the state is high when the investor observes 
signal s2. As it stands, (3.8) shows the three choices faced by the investor if the 
first entrepreneur emits s2. First, if v(s2) is negative, the investor does not lend at 
all. Otherwise, the maximisation problem on the right-hand side of (3.8) reflects 
the investor’s choice of whether to contact the second entrepreneur. If the investor 
decides to grant a risky loan after contacting only one entrepreneur, her expected 
payoff is given by (3.3). From (3.8) we observe that the investor contacts the 
second entrepreneur if 
 
() ) s ( v c ) s , s ( v ) t 1 ( r Y t 2 R 2 2 R 2 2 + ≥ − + −  (3.10) 
 
In Appendix 1 we prove that the investor’s optimal lending strategy after 
observing s2 satisfies the following conditions: 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that the first loan applicant’s type is unknown (signal s2). 
Then, 
i) if the contacting cost (c) is sufficiently low, the investor contacts a second loan 
applicant and compares him with the first one, 
ii) if c is sufficiently high and if either the prior probability that a loan applicant 
has a good project (g) is sufficiently high or if the prior probability of a high state 
(h) is sufficiently low to render the net present value of a risky loan to the first 
loan applicant positive (vR(s2) > 0), the investor grants a risky loan to the first 
applicant. 
iii) if c is sufficiently high and if either g is sufficiently low or h sufficiently high to 
render vR(s2) ≤ 0, the investor does not lend at all. 
 
Although the formal proof of the first part of the proposition is fairly tedious, the 
underlying tradeoff is clear from (3.10): The LHS of (3.10) shows the benefits of 
comparing: with positive probability (t2) the second contact will probably 
eliminate the asymmetric information problem and, even if it does not, the 
investor can gather more information by comparing entrepreneurs and updating 
her beliefs. The cost of comparing is on the RHS of (3.10). Besides the cost of 
contacting, the opportunity cost of comparing stems from the possibility to grant a 
risky loan to the first entrepreneur. For the case g > 1/2, it is easy to see why part 
i) of Proposition 1 must be true, since then  ) s ( v ) s , s ( v r Y 2 R 2 2 R ≥ > − , ie, the 
payoff from comparing clearly exceeds the value of the risky loan. But it turns out 
that the same conclusion holds even for g < 1/2, so the benefits exceed the cost of 
comparing when the cost of monitoring is sufficiently low. 
  In the first case in Table 1 we give a numeric example where the investor 
optimally compares entrepreneurs when the first entrepreneur emits s2. The  
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parameter values of interest are g  =  0.25, h  =  0.5, and c  =  0.1.
4 If the first 
entrepreneur emits s1, the investor’s profit is unity. If the first signal is s3, the 
investor contacts the second entrepreneur and earns an expected return of 0.15. If 
the first entrepreneur emits s2, the probability that he has a good project is 
relatively low (0.25) and a risky loan is unprofitable. Instead, the investor contacts 
a second entrepreneur, since that eliminates information asymmetry with 
probability 0.375. Although a risky loan remains unprofitable if information 
asymmetry is not eliminated, contacting is optimal because the cost of contacting 
is low (c = 0.1). 
  As part ii) suggests, the investor may prefer to grant a risky loan to the first 
entrepreneur over comparing entrepreneurs. This alternative is rational if the cost 
of contacting is sufficiently high. The risky-loan strategy may also be optimal 
with moderate or even with low contacting cost if the first entrepreneur is good 
with sufficiently high probability, that is, when  ) s g ( p 2  is close to one. As (3.4) 
shows, this possibility arises when g is close to one or h is close to zero. In such 
circumstances, asymmetric information causes a minor nuisance and the expected 
benefits of comparing do not cover the cost of contacting. Instead of wasting 
resources in comparing, the investor optimally grants the risky loan with positive 
expected return  ) 0 r Y ) s g ( p ( 2 > − . 
  A numerical example in which granting a risky loan to the first entrepreneur is 
optimal can be found in Case 2 of Table 1. Here g = 0.75, h = 0.25, and c = 0.5. 
Because the priors of a good entrepreneur and a low state are high (both 0.75), the 
first entrepreneur, emitting s2, is good with a probability of 0.9. Together with 
relatively costly contacting (c = 0.5) this makes contacting a second entrepreneur 
unprofitable. The investor optimally grants a risky loan to the first entrepreneur, 
knowing that the loan will be defaulted with probability 0.1. 
  Part iii) of Proposition 1 can also be seen from (3.10). The investor prefers not 
to lend at all after signal s2 if the expected return on a risky loan is not positive 
and the cost of contacting is sufficiently high to render a search for a second 
entrepreneur unprofitable. This possibility is illustrated by Case 3 of Table 1, with 
g = 0.75, h = 10/11, and c = 0.65. With these parameters, an average entrepreneur 
has a good project and the state is very likely high so that signal s2 probably 
indicates a bad entrepreneur. Thus a risky loan upon observing s2 is unprofitable. 
Nor is it profitable to seek a second entrepreneur and compare with the first, since 
contacting is so costly. As a result, the investor exits the loan market upon 
receiving signal s2 from the first entrepreneur. Note that it is profitable to seek a 
first entrepreneur but not a second one: The probability that information 
asymmetry will be eliminated by contacting the first entrepreneur is fairly high 
) 7 . 0 ) g 1 )( h 1 ( hg ( ≈ − − + . However, if asymmetric information obtains, the 
                                                 
4 In all numerical examples we hold Y at 2 and r at 1 and vary g, h, and c.  
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probability that the problem will be eliminated by seeking a second entrepreneur 
is somewhat lower (below 0.64). 
  The value of a loan. We have above determined the conditional value of a 
loan for the three possible values of the first signal. The initial value of a loan – 
the investor’s expected return before she has contacted either loan applicant – is 
then given by 
 
() ( ) [] ( ) c ) s ( v ) g 1 ( h 1 ) s ( v g h 1 ) g 1 ( h r Y hg V 3 2 2 N − − − + − + − + − = =  (3.11) 
 
In (3.11) v(s2) and vs3) are given by (3.8) and (3.5), and they give the values of a 
loan to the investor after she receives signals s2 and s3 from the first entrepreneur. 
The value of a loan when the first entrepreneur emits st is simply  r Y − . These 
values of loans are weighted by the appropriate probabilities: with probability hg 
the signal of the first entrepreneur is s1, with probability  () [ ] g h 1 ) g 1 ( h − + −  the 
signal is s2, and with probability  ) g 1 )( h 1 ( − −  it is s3. 
  That the investor’s optimal strategy under asymmetric information and 
comparing is feasible can be seen from (3.11). After contacting the first 
entrepreneur, the investor can gather more information by seeking a second 
entrepreneur and comparing with the first. If the signal from the first entrepreneur 
is ‘better’ than the signal of the second, the first proves to be worthy of finance 
and vice versa. If the contacted entrepreneurs emit identical signals, the investor 
can update her prior beliefs on the state of the world and types of entrepreneurs, 
but the asymmetric information problem remains. The investor will search for a 
second entrepreneur if the benefits outweigh the opportunity costs of comparing. 
If the cost of contacting is sufficiently large, the investor may want to grant a 
risky loan to the first entrepreneur without comparing, although there is higher 
risk of credit loss than for a risky investment after comparing. Alternatively, the 
investor will not grant a loan at all. If VN=2≥0 the loan market opens up. This 
occurs if c is not too high. If VN=2 ≥  0, the Assumption also holds, but not 
necessarily vice versa. 
  We summarise the benefits of comparing based on the above analysis as 
follows: 
 
Proposition 2. By comparing two loan applicants, the investor can gather more 
information and raise the expected return on her loan. If the applicants emit 
different signals, information asymmery is eliminated, and the investor can grant 
the loan to the good applicant. Even if both applicants emit the same signal (s2) 
and asymmetric information obtains, the investor can update prior beliefs on state 
of the world and types of applicants. 
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We give an example of the last point – the benefits of comparing when both loan 
applicants release s2 – in Case 4 of Table 1. The parameter values are g = 0.25, 
h = 0.2, and c = 0.1. Now monitoring is cheap and the investor contacts the second 
entrepreneur if the first emits s2 as predicted by part i) of Proposition 1. Upon 
observing the first entrepreneur emitting s2, a risky loan appears to be profitable 
) 14 . 0 r Y ) s g ( p ( 2 ≈ − . Yet, when the investor has contacted two entrepreneurs 
emitting s2, she is no longer willing to grant a loan since  0 r Y ) s , s g ( p 2 2 < − . 
Intuitively, since both the state of the world is likely to be low (h is low) and 
average entrepreneur is likely to be bad (g is low), the investor sees that one 
entrepreneur emitting s2 is a good type with a relatively high probability 
) 57 . 0 ) s g ( p ( 2 ≈ . Upon observing two entrepreneurs emitting s2, however, the 
investor begins to put more weight on the possibility that the state is high and 
consequently on the possibility that an entrepreneur with s2 represents a bad type 
) 31 . 0 ) s , s g ( p ( 2 2 ≈ . Thus a loan applicant emitting s2, who initially seemed to be 
promising, proves to be unattractive after more detailed analysis. Hence 
comparing provides valuable information even when the investor contacts only 
identical loan applicants emitting s2 and the problem of asymmetric information 
remains. 
  In spite of all the benefits of comparing, the investor’s lending decision is still 
less efficient than under perfect information. From (3.1) and (3.11), we see that 
four inefficiencies remain: i) With probability  g ) h 1 ( − , the first entrepreneur is 
good, but his type is unobservable to the investor. The investor may waste 
resources by searching for a second entrepreneur or she may inefficiently exit the 
credit markets; ii) With probability 
2 g ) h 1 ( − , the investor encounters two good 
entrepreneurs emitting s2, but the entrepreneurs’ types remain unobservable. If 
r Y ) s , s g ( p 2 2 < , the investor makes a mistake and denies a loan; iii) With 
probability ) g 1 ( h − , the investor contacts a bad entrepreneur who signals s2, 
while the entrepreneur’s type remains unobservable. The investor inefficiently 
grants a loan, if c is sufficiently high and  r Y ) s g ( p 2 2 >  (part ii) of Proposition 1); 
iv) With probability 
2 ) g 1 ( h − , the investor contacts two bad entrepreneurs with s2. 
The investor grants a loan if  r Y ) s , s g ( p 2 2 2 > . The loan results in a credit loss. 
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Table 1.   Four numerical examples with 
      N = 2, Y = 2, and r = 1 
 
  CASE 1  CASE 2  CASE 3  CASE 4 
  g = 1/4; h = 1/2; 
c = 1/10 
g = 3/4; h = 1/4; 
c = 1/2 
g = 3/4; h = 10/11; 
c = 65/100 
g = 1/4; h = 1/5; 
c = 1/10 
p(g|s2)  0.25 0.9  0.23077  0.57143 
vR(s2) 0  0.8  0  0.14286 
v(s2)  0.15 0.25 0.1  0.15 
p(g|s2,s2)  0.1 0.96429  0.47368  0.30769 
vR(s2,s2) 0  0.92857  0  0 
t2 0.375 0.3  0.63462  0.53571 
v(s2) 0.275  0.8  0  0.43571 
VN=2  0.21875 0.23438 0.03409  0.1925 
 
 
3.4  Discussion of results 
The model with one investor and two entrepreneurs is admittedly limited. In the 
subsequent sections we will allow for multiple entrepreneurs and financiers. 
However, the basic insight about the value of comparing does not change. To gain 
intuition for the upcoming results and illustrate the value of comparing, we revisit 
some of the examples of section 2.2. As mentioned in section 2.2, the signals have 
two core properties: each signal is informative and the value of the signal depends 
on the state of the world. Given the first property, it is the second property that 
underlies the value of comparing.  
 
•  Variation of signals across sectors: As mentioned, financial ratios reveal 
valuable information to investors, but a part of this information is sector-
specific. That is, even when the financial ratios of a sector are fixed in time, 
the critical values of financial ratios differ across sectors. Hence, if an 
investor who has no previous experience in the sector evaluates a firm, the 
firm’s financial ratios do not reveal its true financial condition to the investor. 
To gather credible information and evaluate the firm properly, the investor 
must compare the financial ratios of the firm with the financial ratios of the 
other firms in the very same sector. Only after studying sufficiently many 
firms, will the investor understand the meaning of financial ratios in the sector 
and be able to use them in lending decisions. 
 
•  Variation of signals over time: The investor may have previous experience in 
the sector, but the signal value fluctuates over time, making the information 
value of a single signal modest. For instance, the profit of a copper mine may 
appear to be moderate. Yet, a detailed comparison may uncover that the 
whole sector has been booming and the profit of the mine is relatively poor.  
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The incipient recession is likely to hit the mine hard. Without comparing, the 
investor might make a serious mistake by financing the copper mine. 
 
•  Variation of signals across regions: Production costs and market potential 
differ from one region to another. To be able to evaluate the competitiveness 
of a firm in its local region, the investor needs to compare the firm’s cost and 
customer structure with its local competitors. 
 
•  Variation of signals in research and development: The progress of research 
and development is stochastic almost by definition. At first glance, the 
prototype of an entrepreneur may seem to be promising. However, careful 
comparison with the other entrepreneurs in the sector may reveal that the 
prototype is lagging. Financing the first entrepreneur is likely to be a mistake 
since its product will hardly be commercially viable. 
 
•  Variation of signals according to the equilibrium of the game. Multiple 
equilibria are pervasive in network industries. A network firm’s profit may be 
negative, but contrasting the firm with other firms in the industry may reveal 
that the firm has a relatively large customer base, and that the firms are 
engaged in fierce competition for clear dominance where all firms are making 
losses. It is likely that the firm will win the competition and obtain a dominant 
position in the market. Once in the dominant position, the firm will be able to 
raise its price and make substantial profits. Denying the firm finance would 
probably be a mistake. 
 
 
4  Comparing with N loan applicants 
So far we have assumed that the investor can contact at most two firms. This 
leaves open the robustness of the results with respect to the number of 
entrepreneurs. In this section we briefly consider a more general case where the 
number of entrepreneurs is, N ∈ Z
+. Although a complete analysis of the case is 
beyond the scope of this study, our brief analysis confirms that the insights gained 
from the two entrepreneur case apply for a larger pool of loan applicants. 
  We first show how information asymmetry can be eliminated with certainty 
when the number of compared entrepreneurs approaches infinity. Recall that 
asymmetric information obtains only if the investor receives signal s2, because 
then the state can be high and the entrepreneur bad, or the state can be low and the 
entrepreneur good. Since each entrepreneur is good with probability g and bad 
with probability  g 1− , the numbers of good and bad entrepreneurs is binomially 
distributed. Consequently, when the number of compared entrepreneurs grows,  
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asymmetric information still obtains after n contacts only with probability 
n n ) g 1 ( h g ) h 1 ( − + − . With probability  h 1−  the state is low and with probability 
g
n the investor has contacted only good entrepreneurs. With probabilities h and 
n ) g 1 ( −  the state is high and the investor has compared only bad entrepreneurs. 
Because probabilities g
n and 
n ) g 1 ( −  are decreasing in n, the probability that 
asymmetric information obtains approaches zero, when n  → ∞. Moreover, the 
probability that asymmetric information obtains falls rapidly fast when n 
increases. For example, with  3
1
2
1 g , h = =  and n = 2, the probability is 5/18 ≈ 0.28 













. In words, information 
asymmetry can be virtually eliminated by ten contacts. 
  Even if the investor has not received two different signals over the first n first 
contacts, and asymmetric information in theory remains, comparing can in 
practice render the remaining information asymmetry insignificant. To see this, 
consider the nth entrepreneur who, like all previous  1 n −  entrepreneurs, emits s2. 
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=  (4.1) 
 
where  ] s ,..., s , s [ S n , 2 2 , 2 1 , 2 n , 2 =  is the vector of signals s2 emitted by n entrepreneurs. 
From (4.1) it is evident that if  2
1 g < , the probability that signal s2 indicates a 




1 h , g = = , and n  =  10 result in  01 , 0
1025
1
) S g ( p 10 , g < = , ie, the 
entrepreneurs emitting s2 are bad almost with certainty. Similarly, if  2
1 g > , the 
probability that entrepreneurs emitting s2 are good is rapidly increasing in n. In the 
limit when n approaches infinity, informational asymmetry is removed with 
certainty: If  2
1 g < ,  0 ) S g ( p lim n , g n =
∞ > − , and if  2
1 g > ,  1 ) S g ( p lim n , g n =
∞ > − . We 
summarise the above observations in the following result. 
 
Proposition 3.  Information asymmetry can be rendered insignificant by 
comparing sufficiently many loan applicants. When the number of compared loan 
applicants increases, the investor either eventually contacts two different loan  
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applicants, which eliminates the asymmetric information problem, or updates her 
prior belief about type of loan applicant, which ultimately results in the same 
outcome. 
 
As Proposition 3 suggests, comparing works through two different channels. The 
first exploits differences in signals. Sooner or later the investor will encounter a 
signal that differs from the previous signal or signals. This immediately removes 
information asymmetry. The second channel exploits the absence of differences in 
signals. If the entrepreneurs continue to emit the same signal, the investor can 
simply update her beliefs about state of the world and type of entrepreneur. With 
sufficiently many observations, the investor should be quite confident about the 
meaning of the signal. The latter channel illustrates how comparing comes close 
to experimentation or learning in the more traditional context, with a slight 
difference: comparing requires only one signal from one entrepreneur and can in 
principle occur within one time period, whereas experimentation and traditional 
learning require many observations on the same entrepreneur over time. 
  The above discussion dismisses the costs of comparing. If the investor 
contacts n firms, the total cost of contacting amounts to nc. It is not clear whether 
the benefits of comparing cover the costs. We next investigate the investor’s 
optimal choice of how much to invest in information gathering, taking into 
account the costs. 
  The initial value of a loan can be written analogously to (3.11) as 
 
() ( ) [] ( ) c ) s ( v ) g 1 ( h 1 ) s ( v g h 1 ) g 1 ( h r Y hg V 3 N 2 N N − − − + − + − + − =  (4.2) 
 
where subscript N denotes the total number of entrepreneurs. As in the case of 
two loan applicants, the investor immediately stops comparing and grants a loan if 
the signal is s1. This possibility is captured by the first term in the right-hand side 
of (4.2). The second and third term arise from the cases where the first signal is s2 
or s3. 
  The first signal is s3. As discussed in the previous section, if the first signal is 
s3, the investor knows that the state is low and the entrepreneur is bad with 
certainty. If the second entrepreneur releases s2, the investor can eliminate 
information asymmetry by comparing signals. If the second contact also yields s3, 
the investor does not lend and may or may not continue comparing. Thus the 
value of a loan when there are N potential entrepreneurs and when the first signal 
is s3 can be written as 
 
{} 0   ), s , s ( v ) g 1 ( c ) r Y ( g max ) s ( v 3 3 3 N − + − − =  (4.3) 
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where v(s3,s3) is the value of a loan after two observations of s3. Note that v(s3,s3) 
cannot be negative, as the investor can always stop comparing and decide not to 
grant a loan at all. Since also  0 c ) r Y ( g > − −  by the Assumption, the investor 
continues comparing if the first signal is s3. Because the investor’s problem is 











) g 1 ( 1
c ) r Y ( g ) s ( v
1 N
3 N  (4.4) 
 
In words, (4.4) suggests that if the first signal is s3, the investor continues 
comparing the loan applicants until she encounters signal s2. The value of the loan 
is increasing in the total number of loan applicants in the economy. As the total 
number of loan applicants increases, it becomes increasingly likely that the 
investor will find a good applicant and can grant a loan. 
  The first signal is s2. As in section 3, if the first signal is s2, and the second 
signal is different (either s1 or s3), information asymmetry is eliminated and the 
investor can make an optimal lending decision. However, if the second signal is 
also s2, the investor updates both the probability that signal s2 indicates a good 
entrepreneur and that information asymmetry can be eliminated by the next 
contact. With more than two loan applicants, the investor encounters three choices 
at this juncture. She can grant a loan to either of the entrepreneurs emitting signal 
s2, she can decide to exit the credit market without lending, or she can proceed to 
compare a third loan applicant. If she takes the last option, she will be in a similar 
but not identical position as after the second contact: either the information 
asymmetry is eliminated or she can update her beliefs. 
  In general, after the investor has encountered  1 n −  entrepreneurs who have 
emitted s2, the value of a loan can be written as 
 
() { } c ) S ( v ) t 1 ( r Y t   ), S ( v max ) S ( v n , 2 n n 1 n , 2 R 1 n , 2 − − + − = − −  (4.5) 
 
where  {} 0 , r Y ) S g ( p max ) S ( v 1 n . 2 1 n , 2 R − = − −  is the value of a risky loan after  1 n −  s2 
signals and where  [ ] ) g 1 ( ) S h ( p 1 g ) S h ( p t 1 n , 2 1 n , 2 n − − + = − −  is the probability that 
information asymmetry will be eliminated by the nth contact. Here 
) S g ( p 1
g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h
) g 1 ( h
) S h ( p 1 n , 2 1 n 1 n
1 n





=  is the conditional probability 
that the state is high when all  1 n −  previous entrepreneurs have emitted signal s2. 
  The value of the loan (4.5) could be solved backwards, beginning with the 
termination payoff  { } 0 , r Y ) S g ( p max ) S ( v N . 2 N , 2 R − = . Because the problem is non-
stationary, however, solving (4.5) completely is a messy exercise and does not  
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yield substantial insights. Nonetheless, a few general results can be obtained from 
(4.5). The first of them is proved in Appendix 2. 
 
Proposition 4. If the net present value of a risky loan to the first loan applicant is 
negative (vR(s2) ≤ 0) and the prior probability that a loan applicant has a good 
project is less than one half (g  <  ½), the investor continues to contact and 
compare new loan applicants until the problem of asymmetric information is 
eliminated. 
 
To understand Proposition 4, recall from (4.1) that  ) S g ( p n , 2  is decreasing in n 
when  2
1 g < . Thus, if granting a risky loan to the first entrepreneur emitting s2 is 
unprofitable  ) r Y ) s g ( p ( 2 < , it will remain unprofitable for all subsequent 
entrepreneurs emitting s2. This leaves the investor with two choices: either she 
should compare entrepreneurs until information asymmetry is eliminated or stop 
comparing and exit the market. It turns out that an exit, yielding zero payoff is not 
optimal if  2
1 g < . In the case of  2
1 g <  the probability that a new contact eliminates 
information asymmetry exceeds g and, thus the expected return from each new 
contact exceeds  0 c ) r Y ( g > − −  (recall the Assumption). The investor thus 
compares entrepreneurs until information asymmetry is eliminated. With bad 
luck, the investor may end up comparing entrepreneurs forever if  ∞ = N . Under 
the parameter values of Case 1 of Table 1, the investor operates as predicted by 
Proposition 4. 
 If  2
1 g > , the investor’s behaviour is different. In such circumstance the 
optimal number of comparisons is always finite, as verified by the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. If g > ½, the investor stops comparing new loan applicants even if 
information asymmetry remains. 
 
We give a heuristic argument here (the formal proof is in Appendix 3). On the one 
hand,  ) S g ( p n , 2  is increasing in n by (4.1), if  2
1 g > . The probability approaches 
unity when n is large enough, and the expected return from a risky loan, 
r Y ) S g ( p n , 2 − , approaches  r Y − . On the other hand, the expected return from 
contacting a new loan applicant is always lower than  c r Y − − . Thus, when n is 
large enough, the investor prefers granting a risky loan to contacting and 
comparing a new loan applicant, and the number of compared loan applicants is 
finite. 
  An implication of Proposition 5 is that granting a risky loan can be optimal 
already to the first entrepreneur, as in the two-entrepreneur economy of section 
3.3. That is, if the type of the first entrepreneur is unknown (signal is s2), the  
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investor optimally grants a loan to him instead of contacting more loan applicants. 
It is easy to see that such a risky loan strategy is optimal if the first loan applicant 
is good with a sufficiently high probability or if the contacting is sufficiently 
costly. For example, this investment strategy is optimal under the parameter 
values of Case 2 in Table 1. In that case, the risky loan yields 
8 . 0 1 2 9 . 0 r Y ) s g ( p 2 = − ⋅ = − , whereas the maximal return that the investor can 
obtain by contacting more loan applicants is lower than  = − − = − − 5 . 0 1 2 c r Y  
5 . 0 . Since 0.8 > 0.5, the investor grants a loan to the first firm. 
 
 
5  Multiple investors and financial intermediation 
Sections 3 and 4 show how comparing is beneficial even if there is only one 
investor in the credit market. If there are multiple investors, however, an 
arrangement wherein each investor separately collects information has many 
shortcomings: If an investor contacts one loan applicant who emits s2, the investor 
operates under asymmetric information. If the investor grants a loan, she may 
finance a bad firm. If she does not grant a loan, she may deny a good entrepreneur 
a loan. The investor can gather more information by comparing several loan 
applicants. But this is costly. Each investor needs to contact several loan 
applicants even if each investor can grant only one loan. Each loan applicant is 
then contacted several times although each time the monitoring provides the very 
same information. Moreover, an investor cannot be sure ex ante that comparing 
several entrepreneurs will eliminate information asymmetry. In this section we 
show how investors can overcome these shortcomings by establishing a financial 
intermediary. 
  For brevity, we focus on the case where there are equally many entrepreneurs 
and investors. Suppose that the investors establish a financial intermediary. Each 
investor first invests her endowment in the intermediary and contacts one loan 
applicant. Then, the investors exchange information. It is simply assumed that 
investors cooperating within the intermediary can monitor each other at no cost. 
This kind of an intermediary reminds us of that in Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
(1984) and Milton and Thakor (1985), except that our intermediary accepts funds 
for investment.
5 By exchanging information, the investors can reap the benefits of 
comparing without duplication of contacting cost. If the investors have 
encountered two different signals, the investors learn the state of the world and 
can separate good from bad loan applicants. The intermediary can then grant loans 
to all good loan applicants, while investing the rest of the funds at the risk-free 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, we could follow Diamond (1984) in assuming that investors choose one among 
them to carry out contacting and comparing loan applicants.  
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interest rate r. Even if all signals are alike, the intermediary can update beliefs 
about state of the world and types of loan applicants. All this can be achieved by 
contacting each loan applicant only once. 
  As the financial intermediary grows, it becomes increasingly likely that the 
intermediary will have two different types of loan applicants, which eliminates 
information asymmetry. Even if all its loan applicants are similar, the 
intermediary becomes increasingly confident about the true state of the world and 
types of its loan applicants. In the limit, when the financial intermediary is 
sufficiently large, the information asymmetry will be eliminated with certainty 
(Proposition 3), and the number of monitored loan applicants is equal to the units 
of the funds invested. To put it differently, a sufficiently large financial 
intermediary achieves the very same optimal solution that is achieved under 
perfect information. A conclusion follows: 
 
Proposition 6. If the investors join together and establish a financial 
intermediary, each loan applicant is contacted only once and the duplication of 
contacting cost is avoided. When the intermediary is sufficiently large, 
information asymmetry will be removed with certainty. 
 
This result resembles that of Diamond (1984). In both models, a financial 
intermediary is bank-like and eliminates the duplication of information provision, 
thereby cutting the costs of lending. Nonetheless, the models differ in some 
important aspects: In Diamond (1984), centralised information provision is 
profitable, since a single investor can finance only a small fraction of a project. 
Thus many investors are needed to finance the whole project. If each investor 
monitored the project, the cost of monitoring would be duplicated. The 
duplication can be eliminated by establishing a financial intermediary, which 
monitors the project only once. On the contrary, in our model, centralised 
information provision is profitable even if a single investor finances the whole 
project. Although a single investor finances only one project, she should contact 
numerous loan applicants to gather information. With multiple investors, the same 
loan applicants would be contacted by several investors and the cost of contacting 
would be duplicated. Useless duplication can be avoided by establishing a 
centralised intermediary, which contacts each loan applicant only once. 
  Another difference versus Diamond (1984) arises if we take the time 
dimension seriously. Suppose each investor can contact only one entrepreneur in a 
period. For an investor operating in isolation, it takes many periods to compare 
several entrepreneurs and gather information. But if the investors form a financial 
intermediary, they can compare all entrepreneurs in one period. In other words, 
even if there are no contacting costs other than the opportunity cost of time, 
comparing is conducive to centralised financial intermediation.   
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  Finally, note that investors have no incentive to form a coalition to dampen 
the interest rate competition, since by assumption they can extract all the surplus 
from entrepreneurs. The tendency towards centralised financial intermediation 
arises solely from economics of scale in comparing. 
  Pushing the argument for centralised financial intermediation to the limit, we 
can also determine the deposit rate in the credit market. Let Π denote the total 
profit of the intermediary. If the intermediary has N investors (as well as loan 
applicants),  Π N
1  is the profit share of a single investor. 
 
Proposition 7. A sufficiently large intermediary can pay to an investor-member a 
fixed return, of  c r ) g 1 ( gY lim r N
1
N D − − + = Π ≡
∞ → . 
 
The result follows from the law of large numbers. We can also interpret rD as the 
deposit interest rate for the credit market, because the left-over funds are invested 
in the outside option at interest rate r. At the beginning of period, each investor 
deposits her unit in the intermediary, which invests a share g of the funds in good 
projects and puts the rest in the outside option. At the end of the period, the loans 
yield a net return of  ) c gY ( N −  and the outside option yields  r ) g 1 ( N − . The 
intermediary can then pay a return of rD per deposit unit. Hence both the lending 
interest rate, Y, and deposit interest rate, rD, are determined in the model. From 
the assumed market structure, it follows that depositors gain the full project 





In this paper we study comparing as a source of information in financial markets. 
Comparing is a simple instrument of learning. It has many features common with 
other forms of learning such as learning by doing, experimentation and imitation. 
The other forms of learning, however, require many observations on the same 
entrepreneur over time whereas comparing exploits the differences between 
entrepreneurs. We show how comparing reduces information asymmetry. By 
comparing sufficiently many entrepreneurs, an investor can separate good from 
bad loan applicants. The optimal number of compared entrepreneurs is inversely 
related to the cost of contacting and directly related to the magnitude of the 
asymmetric information problem.  
                                                 
6 Following Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) we abstract from costs of the information exchange 
within the intermediary. Obviously, internal monitoring in the intermediary is hardly costless as 
argued by Millon and Thakor (1985). However, proper analysis of information utilisation within 
the intermediary would require careful modelling of information exchange along the lines of 
Pagano and Japelli (1993) and is left for future research.  
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  Even the extreme cases of no comparing and comparing all entrepreneurs 
irrespective of the total number turn out to be rational. On the one hand, if the 
initial probability of encountering a good entrepreneur is sufficiently high, 
asymmetric information is not an important problem. If also contacting is 
sufficiently costly, the benefits of comparing do not offset its costs, and the 
investor grants a loan without comparing entrepreneurs. On the other hand, if the 
problem of asymmetric information is severe (low initial probability that a 
randomly selected entrepreneur has a good project) and comparing is cheap, it 
may be optimal to compare entrepreneurs until information asymmetry is 
eliminated. 
  If every investor invests in comparing, information gathering will be 
inefficient, since loan applicants are compared several times with zero 
information gain. To prevent the useless duplication of comparing, the investors 
optimally join together and establish a financial intermediary, which contacts each 
loan applicant only once. If the intermediary can grow without bound, the 
problem of asymmetric information can be eliminated with certainty without 
further investment in information acquisition. This provides a novel rationale for 
centralised financial intermediation. 
  An implication of our model is that financial institutions such as banks can 
become dominant financiers of an industry by exploiting scale economies in 
comparing. Once a bank has gathered information about firms in the industry by 
comparing them, it is difficult for new financial institutions to enter the market for 
finance of the industry. The entrants should start the process of comparing from 
the beginning whereas the established financiers know the firms and the signals. 
Thus, even if the incumbents and entrants observe the same information about 
funding applicants, the incumbents may have an information advantage since they 
are able to interpret the information correctly. Only in new industries, will old and 
new financiers compete on equal footing. In such circumstances the efficient use 
of comparing can be the crucial determinant of financial institutions’ successes 
and failures. 
  Indeed, although we have emphasised the role of comparing in credit markets 
and that the intermediary arising from our analysis is bank-like, comparing is 
perhaps even more relevant for venture capital financiers and other entities that 
focus on financing new high-tech industries. As carefully documented by 
Gompers and Lerner (2004), such venture financiers frequently encounter ideas 
for businesses in areas where there is little available information. The lack of track 
records for applicants or business area does not lead to the collapse of markets for 
innovation finance, since venture capitalists seek many applications from the 
same narrow area. In comparing applications, it becomes evident that funding 
should be denied to some business ideas. More promising ideas are extensively 
scrutinised by means of both formal studies of the technology and market strategy 
and informal assessments of potential entrepreneurs’ human capital and  
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credibility. The most promising projects receive the first stage financing. The 
success of financed firms is intensively monitored by the venture capitalists. After 
a new round of comparing, only the most successful firm can obtain second stage 
financing. The next logical step is to endogenise the form of financial contract so 
as to enable assessment of the relative benefits of comparing in private equity and 




Bergemann, D – Hege, U (1998) Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and 
learning. Journal of Banking & Finance 22, 703–735. 
 
Bergemann, D – Hege, U (2002) The Value of benchmarking. In McCahery, J 
and Renneboog, L (eds.) Venture Capital Contracting and the Valuation of 
High Tech Firms. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Bester, H (1985) Screening vs rationing in credit markets with imperfect 
information. American Economic Review 75, 401–405. 
 
Broecker, T (1990) Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition. 
Econometrica 58(2), 429–452. 
 
Cerasi, V – Daltung, S (2000) The optimal size of a bank: costs and benefits of 
diversification. European Economic Review 44(9), 1701–1726. 
 
de Meza, D – Webb, D (1987) Too much investment, A problem of asymmetric 
information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 281–292. 
 
Diamond, D (1984) Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. 
Review of Economic Studies 51, 393–414. 
 
Freixas, X – Rochet, J-C (1997) Microeconomics of Banking. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Hellwig, M (2000) Financial intermediation with risk aversion. Review of 
Economic Studies 67, 719–742. 
 
Holmström, B – Tirole, J (1997) Financial intermediation, loanable funds and 
the real sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663–691. 
 
Gombers, P – Lerner, J (2004) The Venture Capital Cycle. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2nd Edition. 
 
Gorton, G – Winton, A (2003) Financial Intermediation. In Constantinides, G, 
Harris, M, and Stultz, R M (eds.) Handbook of The Economics of Finance. 
Elsevier, North Holland, Amsterdam. 
  
32 
Krasa, S – Villamil, A (1992) Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure 
for a financial intermediary. Journal of Economic Theory 57, 197–221. 
 
Millon, M – Thakor, A (1985) Moral hazard and information sharing: A 
model of information gathering agencies. Journal of Finance 40, 1403–
1422. 
 
Niinimäki, J-P (2001) Intertemporal diversification in financial 
intermediation. Journal of Banking and Finance 25(5), 965–991. 
 
Pagano, M – Jappelli, T (1993) Information sharing in credit markets. Journal 
of Finance 48, 1693–1718. 
 
Ramakrishnan, R – Thakor, A (1984) Information reliability and a theory of 
financial intermediation. Review of Economic Studies 51, 415–432. 
 
Stiglitz, J – Weiss, A (1981) Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information. American Economic Review 71(3), 393–410. 
 
Von Thadden, E-L (1995) Long-term contracts, short-term investments and 




Proof of proposition 1 
Proof of part i): In the proof we use the following observation frequently 
 
2 2 ) g 1 ( h g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( g g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h − + − = − − − + −  (A1.1) 
 
Given (3.3), (3.6), and (3.10), it is profitable to contact the second applicant if 
 
() {} { } c 0   , r Y ) s g ( p Max 0   , r Y ) s , s g ( p Max ) t 1 ( r Y t 2 2 2 2 2 + − ≥ − − + −  (A1.2) 
 
The inequality is obviously satisfied if  r Y ) s g ( p 2 ≤  for sufficiently low c. Hence, 
we can focus on the case where  r Y ) s g ( p 2 > . There are then two possibilities, 
depending on whether  r Y ) s , s g ( p 2 2 −  is positive or negative. Using (3.9), we 
rewrite  [] ) g 1 ( ) s h ( p 1 g ) s h ( p t 2 2 2 − − + =  as 
g ) h 1 ( ) g 1 ( h
) g 1 ( g
t2 − + −
−
= . As a result, if 
r Y ) s , s g ( p 2 2 < , (A1.2) simplifies to 
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g h 1
r Y
g h 1 ) g 1 ( h







 or, using (A1.1), to 
 
[ ] ( ) [ ]c g h 1 ) g 1 ( h ) g h ( gY ) g 1 ( h g ) h 1 ( r
2 2 − + − ≥ − + − + −  (A1.3) 
 
Adding and subtracting 
2 g ) h 1 ( Y −  in the LHS of (A1.3) yields 
 
[ ] () ( ) [ ]c g h 1 ) g 1 ( h ) g 1 ( Ygh g h 1 Y ) g 1 ( h g ) h 1 ( r
2 2 2 − + − ≥ − + − − − + −  (A1.4) 
 
Since  r Y ) s , s g ( p 2 2 <  implies  [ ]r ) g 1 ( h g ) h 1 ( Y g ) h 1 (
2 2 2 − + − < − , the LHS of 
(A1.4) is positive. Hence, (A1.4) holds if the cost of contacting is sufficiently low. 
  Now assume   r Y ) s , s g ( p 2 2 >  (A1.2) simplifies to 
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which is true if the cost of contacting is sufficiently low. 
 
Proof of part ii): From (A1.2) we see that a necessary condition for the optimality 
of a risky loan to the first entrepreneur is  0 r Y ) s g ( p 2 > − . This holds when 
) s g ( p 2  is sufficiently large, which is true when g is sufficiently large or h is 
sufficiently small (see (3.9)). When  0 r Y ) s g ( p 2 > − , (A1.2) implies that the 
risky loan is optimal if 
 
( ) { } c 0   , r Y ) s , s g ( p Max ) t 1 ( r Y t r Y ) s g ( p 2 2 2 2 2 − − − + − ≥ −  (A1.7) 
 
Because the RHS of (A1.7) is smaller than  c r Y − − , a sufficient condition for 
optimality of the risky-loan is that the LHS of (A1.7) exceed  c r Y − − . As a 
result, a sufficient condition for part ii) of Proposition 1 to hold is 
 
() Y ) s g ( p 1 c 2 − ≥  (A1.8) 
 
Sufficient condition (A1.8) is true if c is sufficiently large or if  ) s g ( p 2  is almost 
equal to one, which occurs when g is close to one or h is close to zero. 
 
Proof of part iii): Clearly, if  , 0 r Y ) s g ( p 2 < −  the investor does not want to 
grant a risky loan to the first entrepreneur. Thus, if the contacting cost is so high 





Proof of proposition 4 
The proof consists of three steps.  
 
Step 1: We show that  n 1 n t t < +  for all n. Rewrite tn as 
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where  1 A g
1 − = . Without loss of generality, we assume that n is continuous. As 
a result, we can differentiate (A2.1) 
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Step 2: We next verify that  g t lim n n =






















∞ → ∞ →  (A2.3) 
 
Step 3: Since we assume that  r Y ) s g ( p 2 <  and since  ) S g ( p n , 2  is decreasing in n 
(recall (4.1)),  r Y ) S g ( p n , 2 <  for all n. Given  r Y ) S g ( p n , 2 < , the value of a risky 
loan is zero for all n, ie,  0 ) S ( v 1 n , 2 R = − . Thus, (4.5) can be concisely written as 
 
() { } c ) S ( v ) t 1 ( r Y t   , 0 max ) S ( v n , 2 n n 1 n . 2 − − + − = −  (A2.4) 
 
If v(S2,n) is positive for all n, the investor will contact and compare loan applicants 
until asymmetric information is eliminated, which occurs when she receives either 
s1 or s3. The RHS of (A2.4) is strictly positive since tn > g (steps 1 and 2) and  
36 
0 c ) r Y ( g > − −  by the Assumption. Hence, after contacting the first loan 
applicant, the investor optimally seeks the second loan applicant and compares 






Proof of proposition 5 
We need to show that if  2
1 g > , the optimal number of compared entrepreneurs is 
finite. Since  ) S g ( p n , 2  is increasing in n if  2
1 g > , and approaches 1 and when 
n→∞ (see (4.1)), there exists a  , 1 p <  such that  0 c r Y r Y p > − − = − . The last 
inequality follows from the Assumption. Let k denote the smallest number of 
contacted loan applicants that satisfies  p ) S g ( p k , 2 ≥ . 
  Equation (4.5) implies that the investor contacts a new loan applicant if 
 
() c ) S ( v ) t 1 ( r Y t ) S ( v n , 2 n n 1 n , 2 R − − + − ≤ −  (A3.1) 
 
where  {} 0   , r Y ) S g ( p max ) S ( v 1 n . 2 1 n , 2 R − = − −  and 
() { } . c ) S ( v ) t 1 ( r Y t   ), S ( v max ) S ( v 1 n , 2 1 n 1 n n , 2 b n . 2 − − + − = + + +  When  k 1 n ≥ − , 
(A3.1) can be written as 
 
() c ) r Y ) S g ( p )( t 1 ( r Y t r Y ) S g ( p n . 2 n n 1 n . 2 − − − + − ≤ − −  (A3.2) 
 
because 
( ) c ) S ( v ) t 1 ( r Y t c r Y r Y ) S g ( p r Y ) S g ( p 1 n , 2 1 n 1 n 1 n . 2 n . 2 − − + − > − − ≥ − > − + + + − . 
Subtracting  c r Y − −  from both sides of (A3.2) yields 
 
( ) ) t 1 ))( S g ( p 1 ( Y c r Y r Y ) S g ( p n n . 2 1 n . 2 − − − ≤ − − − − −  (A3.3) 
 
In (A3.3) the LHS is positive since  k 1 n ≥ − , and the RHS is negative. As a 
result, the inequality is not satisfied, and it is not optimal to go on comparing. 
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